IEA World Energy Outlook 2025 · oil & gas

Three oil markets. The next decade is already in the wells.

Current Policies freezes today’s laws. Stated Policies reads announcements as written. Net Zero 2050 is a destination, not a forecast. 2026 is a shock year the WEO did not draw — slide the horizon; national oil demand and production update from IEA regional trajectories applied to 2025 baselines.

Announced policies as written. Oil flattens near 102 mb/d around 2030, then eases. Gas grows on the US–Qatar LNG wave into the mid-2030s, then plateaus.

Horizon

2035

20252030203520402050

Oil demand

99 mb/d

Stated Policies · 2035

Gas demand

4,780 bcm

OPEC crude

34.2 mb/d

Liquids, regional path.

LNG trade

590 bcm

Oil, three ways.

STEPS peaks near 102 mb/d around 2030. CPS reaches 113 mb/d by 2050. NZE is a different oil market — and not this quarter’s tanker list.

Gas keeps growing — unless it doesn’t.

STEPS: nearly +1%/yr to 2035 on the US–Qatar LNG wave, then a plateau. CPS: 5,600 bcm by 2050.

OPEC versus the Americas — STEPS liquids.

US, Canada, Brazil, Guyana and Argentina are the non-OPEC growth machine. They add barrels. They do not replace Basra when the Strait is closed.

National impact

2035 oil demand under Stated Policies.

Largest absolute changes versus 2025, using regional IEA oil pathways applied to Meridian country baselines.

Country2025 demand2035 demandChange2035 net oil
India5.77.9+2.2-7.2
United States19.417.8-1.6+5.4
China17.015.6-1.4-11.9
Saudi Arabia4.04.6+0.6+7.7
Indonesia1.62.1+0.5-1.6
Japan3.22.7-0.5-2.7
South Korea2.92.5-0.4-2.5
Thailand1.31.7+0.4-1.5
Germany2.11.7-0.4-1.7
Brazil2.62.9+0.3+1.9

Regions

Who adds oil demand. Who subtracts it.

India

oil ×1.38 · gas ×1.55

The oil-demand growth market. Every $10 on Brent is a current-account event. LNG is the swing if prices stay low.

Southeast Asia

oil ×1.32 · gas ×1.48

Refining hubs and manufacturers. Gulf of Thailand gas is in decline; LNG terminals are the 2028–30 replacement.

Africa

oil ×1.35 · gas ×1.42

Demand growth is development — gasoline, diesel, LPG. Export barrels still pay the budgets that import products.

China

oil ×0.92 · gas ×1.28

Gasoline and diesel have been falling for two years. Petrochemicals and the SPR still pull crude. Oil demand may have peaked in 2023–25.

United States

oil ×0.94 · gas ×1.12

Liquids production is the non-OPEC swing; domestic gasoline is the political price. LNG exports set Henry Hub.

Europe

oil ×0.82 · gas ×0.92

Oil demand falls on EVs and efficiency. Gas demand is a winter and industrial residual after 2022.

Middle East

oil ×1.15 · gas ×1.35

Domestic crude-for-power is the quiet tax on export capacity. Solar is the cheapest new kWh; export revenues remain the fiscal hinge.

Latin America

oil ×1.18 · gas ×1.22

Brazil pre-salt and Guyana are the growth pair. Venezuela is a delivery system, not a 2026 glut.

NZE oil

Four things have to be true at once.

Demand destruction, not just substitution

NZE oil is 78 mb/d in 2030 because transport electrifies and petrochemical growth is capped — not because OPEC withholds.

No new long-lead fields

Fields already sanctioned can run. New deepwater, oil sands and Arctic barrels do not clear a 1.5 °C budget.

Methane first

Oil and gas methane is cut more than 80% this decade. It is the cheapest climate wedge the industry actually owns.

Petrostates reprice the budget

Fiscal breakevens in the $80s–120s do not survive $40 oil. Diversification is a solvency question, not a branding one.

Where the upstream money goes.

  • Upstream oilnow $420bn · STEPS ’35 $380bn · NZE $90bn
  • Upstream gasnow $260bn · STEPS ’35 $240bn · NZE $70bn
  • LNG liquefactionnow $85bn · STEPS ’35 $40bn · NZE $10bn
  • Refining & cokingnow $55bn · STEPS ’35 $35bn · NZE $12bn
  • Oil & gas methane abatementnow $18bn · STEPS ’35 $42bn · NZE $65bn

LNG trains already sanctioned will start up into 2028–30 — US 210 bcm, Qatar 142, Australia 86. New long-lead oil fields do not clear a 1.5 °C budget. Methane abatement is the wedge the industry actually owns.