India
oil ×1.38 · gas ×1.55
The oil-demand growth market. Every $10 on Brent is a current-account event. LNG is the swing if prices stay low.
16 September 2026
IEA World Energy Outlook 2025 · oil & gas
Current Policies freezes today’s laws. Stated Policies reads announcements as written. Net Zero 2050 is a destination, not a forecast. 2026 is a shock year the WEO did not draw — slide the horizon; national oil demand and production update from IEA regional trajectories applied to 2025 baselines.
Announced policies as written. Oil flattens near 102 mb/d around 2030, then eases. Gas grows on the US–Qatar LNG wave into the mid-2030s, then plateaus.
Horizon
2035
Oil demand
99 mb/d
Stated Policies · 2035
Gas demand
4,780 bcm
OPEC crude
34.2 mb/d
Liquids, regional path.
LNG trade
590 bcm
STEPS peaks near 102 mb/d around 2030. CPS reaches 113 mb/d by 2050. NZE is a different oil market — and not this quarter’s tanker list.
STEPS: nearly +1%/yr to 2035 on the US–Qatar LNG wave, then a plateau. CPS: 5,600 bcm by 2050.
US, Canada, Brazil, Guyana and Argentina are the non-OPEC growth machine. They add barrels. They do not replace Basra when the Strait is closed.
National impact
Largest absolute changes versus 2025, using regional IEA oil pathways applied to Meridian country baselines.
| Country | 2025 demand | 2035 demand | Change | 2035 net oil |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| India | 5.7 | 7.9 | +2.2 | -7.2 |
| United States | 19.4 | 17.8 | -1.6 | +5.4 |
| China | 17.0 | 15.6 | -1.4 | -11.9 |
| Saudi Arabia | 4.0 | 4.6 | +0.6 | +7.7 |
| Indonesia | 1.6 | 2.1 | +0.5 | -1.6 |
| Japan | 3.2 | 2.7 | -0.5 | -2.7 |
| South Korea | 2.9 | 2.5 | -0.4 | -2.5 |
| Thailand | 1.3 | 1.7 | +0.4 | -1.5 |
| Germany | 2.1 | 1.7 | -0.4 | -1.7 |
| Brazil | 2.6 | 2.9 | +0.3 | +1.9 |
Regions
oil ×1.38 · gas ×1.55
The oil-demand growth market. Every $10 on Brent is a current-account event. LNG is the swing if prices stay low.
oil ×1.32 · gas ×1.48
Refining hubs and manufacturers. Gulf of Thailand gas is in decline; LNG terminals are the 2028–30 replacement.
oil ×1.35 · gas ×1.42
Demand growth is development — gasoline, diesel, LPG. Export barrels still pay the budgets that import products.
oil ×0.92 · gas ×1.28
Gasoline and diesel have been falling for two years. Petrochemicals and the SPR still pull crude. Oil demand may have peaked in 2023–25.
oil ×0.94 · gas ×1.12
Liquids production is the non-OPEC swing; domestic gasoline is the political price. LNG exports set Henry Hub.
oil ×0.82 · gas ×0.92
Oil demand falls on EVs and efficiency. Gas demand is a winter and industrial residual after 2022.
oil ×1.15 · gas ×1.35
Domestic crude-for-power is the quiet tax on export capacity. Solar is the cheapest new kWh; export revenues remain the fiscal hinge.
oil ×1.18 · gas ×1.22
Brazil pre-salt and Guyana are the growth pair. Venezuela is a delivery system, not a 2026 glut.
NZE oil
NZE oil is 78 mb/d in 2030 because transport electrifies and petrochemical growth is capped — not because OPEC withholds.
Fields already sanctioned can run. New deepwater, oil sands and Arctic barrels do not clear a 1.5 °C budget.
Oil and gas methane is cut more than 80% this decade. It is the cheapest climate wedge the industry actually owns.
Fiscal breakevens in the $80s–120s do not survive $40 oil. Diversification is a solvency question, not a branding one.
LNG trains already sanctioned will start up into 2028–30 — US 210 bcm, Qatar 142, Australia 86. New long-lead oil fields do not clear a 1.5 °C budget. Methane abatement is the wedge the industry actually owns.