Chokepoint brief

The strait that prices the barrel.

28 February 2026: Gulf loadings stop. ~20% of seaborne crude and ~20% of seaborne LNG leave the timetable and enter the risk premium. IEA September 2026 still has more than 10 mb/d of Gulf output shut in. This page is that story — not the rest of the atlas.

Gulf shut-in

10 mb/d

~half of pre-war Gulf exports

Exports ~13 mb/d against 25 before the war.

2026 supply

-5.7 mb/d

100.7 mb/d IEA September

Demand -2.5 mb/d. Barrels that cannot sail destroy demand at $100+.

Stocks drawn

507 mb

Since February. The OECD cushion is a calendar, not a replacement for Ras Tanura.

OPEC spare

0.07 mb/d

Shut-in barrels are not spare. They cannot load.

Brent

$107.8

Security premium on the 2026 tape.

Dubai

$105.4

The Asian sour marker. Hormuz cargo.

VLCC AG–CN

$6.4 /bbl

TD3C. Time around the Cape.

JKM

$15.8

$/MMBtu. Qatari trains that cannot sail.

Sequence

Four dates on the water.

The war is a loading programme. These are the marks the physical market still prices.

  1. 28 Feb 2026

    The Strait closes

    Gulf loadings halt. ~20% of seaborne oil and LNG is no longer a timetable; it is a risk premium.

  2. Spring 2026

    Cape takes the overflow

    VLCCs stack on the long way around. Red Sea product already had a Houthi problem; Hormuz made it structural.

  3. August 2026

    Half the Gulf still shut in

    IEA: more than 10 mb/d of Gulf output offline. Exports ~13 mb/d against 25 before the war.

  4. September 2026

    East-West is hit

    The Saudi bypass takes a drone strike. Spare capacity on the IEA sheet is 0.07 mb/d — shut-in barrels are not spare.

Who is offline

A budget that is a Basra loading programme.

Gulf producers are not a single spare-capacity pool. They are six loading programmes and one landlord.

ProducerLiquids
Saudi Arabia11.4
Iraq4.4
Iran5.2
Kuwait2.6
United Arab Emirates4.2
Qatar1.3
Oman1.1

Million barrels per day and oil rent as % of GDP, 2025. Click through for the dossier.

The IEA line

IEA: more than 10 mb/d of Gulf output still shut in as of August. Gulf oil exports ~13 mb/d, nearly half their pre-war level. Insurance, waiting times and the risk premium remain elevated.

Constrained since 28 Feb 2026

The bypass

Saudi East-West pipeline

A drone strike in mid-September forced a shutdown of the main bypass. Saxo estimated ~4% of global supply at risk while storage fills.

Damaged, partially offline

Bypasses

There is no second Hormuz.

Pipelines and the Cape move some barrels. They do not restore 20% of seaborne oil.

Saudi East-West pipeline

~5 mb/d

Damaged

The main Hormuz bypass. A mid-September drone strike took the line down; storage is filling on the Gulf side.

Fujairah / Gulf of Oman

UAE Murban

Open

Loadings east of the Strait. Some UAE crude skips Hormuz; it does not replace Basra or Ras Tanura.

Cape of Good Hope

Time, not barrels

Congested

The long way around. VLCCs stacked on the 12-day detour. Insurance did the rerouting before navies did.

Suez / SUMED

Residual

Thinned

Red Sea risk already pulled product around the Cape. SUMED is not a relief valve while Hormuz is tight.

Who still buys

Import dependence is a loading programme too.

China, India, Japan, Korea and Europe imported most of what they burned. Then the Strait closed.

See it on the water

Cape arcs, idle Gulf nodes, vessels that still move.

The map is the product. Filter crude, toggle 2025 against September 2026, and the hole Hormuz punched is the empty water between Ras Tanura and Ningbo.